Kyle Fedler, Chair of the Religion Department at Ashland University in Ohio, was the speaker on January 17 for the second of nine presentations on "The Moral Status of the Human Fetus" in the Jack W. Provonsha Lectures Series at Loma Linda University. This series is organized by LLU's Center for Christian Bioethics. Mark Carr is the Director and Dawn Gordon is the Manager.
Fedler's title was "Child or Chattel: Biblical Views on the Moral Status of the Embryo." It was clear from the outset that for him the Old and New Testaments constitute a religious canon and not merely a cultural classic. They do for me as well.
The conclusion of his presentation was that combining Biblical perspectives with contemporary scientific knowledge yields the conclusion that the new life should be viewed as a human person from about four to five weeks of gestational age and onward.
This presumably allows for contraceptive measures that frustrate implantation, like IUDs and RU486, so-called "morning after pills," stem cell research and discarding unclaimed embryos at fertility clinics.
Fedler reminded the audience that the Old and New Testaments were written in a variety of genres over a number of centuries a long time ago and that neither makes any direct reference to abortion, pro or con. Arguments from silence either way need to be viewed with caution, he stated.
He reviewed a number of passages that people use in support of the full personhood of the fetus. Some of these speak against shedding human blood(Genesis 9:6) and for having many children IGenesis 13:16 & 15:5). Other passages depict God interacting with prenatal human life: Isaiah (Isaiah 49:1) Jeremiah (Jeremiah 1:4), a psalmist (Psalm 139:13-16) and Job (Job 10:8-11).
Fedler also referred to two passages that seem to accord less than full personhood to the fetus. In one of these (Numbers 5:11-28), he said, the priests are instructed to give women who are suspected of being unfaithful to their husbands a potion that will cause them to abort if they are guilty. This suggests that the lives of fetuses was less important than determining what the women had actually done.
The second passage (Genesis 2:7) states that at creation God breathed "into his nostrils the breath of life; and the man became a living being. " Fedler said that some infer from this passage that the new life should not be viewed as a person until he or she can independently breathe, shortly after birth.
Fedler also commented on the most controversial passage of them all:
When people who are fighting injure a pregnant woman so that there is a miscarriage, and yet no further harm follows, the one responsible shall be fined what the woman's husband demands, paying as much as the the judges determine. If any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe. Exodus 21:22-24. New Revised Standard Version.
He identified three interpretative translations. In the New Revised Standard Version one finds the most frequent reading. This is that the lighter penalty of a fine is appropriate if the woman miscarries but experiences no further harm. If she, the woman, is harmed above and beyond the miscarriage, the more severe penalty is required.
In the New International Version the woman does not miscarry; she prematurely gives birth to a living infant. If this is all that happens, the fine applies. But if in addition to this either the mother or the prematurely born infant is harmed, then the greater punishment is required.
Both the NRSV and the NIV are contemporary translations, the first more "ecumenical" and the second more "evangelical" as people in the United States often use these terms.
Felder checked the Septuagint as well. In this ancient Greek translation of the Old Testament Hebrew, the distinction is between an unformed and formed fetus when the woman miscarries. If it is "unformed," presumably because it is very young in gestational age, the fine is the penalty. If the fetus is formed, presumably because it is further along in the pregnancy, it is the more drastic "life for life, eye for eye" and so forth.
Fedler noted that some see in the New Testament condemnations of pharmakeia (Galatians 5:19-21 and Revelation 9:21) a warning against using drugs that cause abortions. He also notes that the text uses brephos, a Greek word for "child," when it declares that John jumped in his mother Elizabeth's womb when she heard the greeting of Mary, who was pregnant with Jesus.
Finding none of these passages definitively illuminating, whether in the Old or New Testament, Felder followed Richard Hayes in The Moral Vision of the New Testament (HarperSanFrancisco, 1996) in seeking guidance from seemingly unrelated passages that may actually be more helpful. One of these is the story Jesus told about "The Good Samaritan" (Luke 10:25-37) in which the boundaries between those who are worthy of our protection and assistance are broadened to include more those often left out.
Another is the suggestion that Christians ought to follow the example of Jesus Christ, "Who though he was in the form of God, did hot regard equality with God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself,taking the form of a slave" and so forth (Philippians 1:5-7). Instead of giving us specific instructions, Fedler suggested that passages such as these depict in broad strokes what kinds of people those of us who are Christians should be and what kinds of things we should do."
Fedler's own proposal was that "somewhere between two weeks and four weeks the embryo undergoes developments that result in it becoming what the Bible would characterize as a person." This rests upon what he understands "Biblical personhood," to be, on the one hand, and scientific evidence, on the other.
"Possessing human DNA is neither sufficient nor necessary for being a 'person,' he held. It is not sufficient because things like skin cells have human DNA and no one thinks of them as "persons." It is not necessary because there may well be "persons" who do not have human DNA. If I recall correctly, Fedler described ET as a "person" of this sort.
To be a "person" in the Biblical sense of the term, Fedler contended, is to be an individual who either has the ability to be in relationships--presumably, I'm guessing, with self, others and God--or this potential. He held that the new life begins to possess this potential between four and five weeks of gestational age because this is when its central nervous system begins to form. Before then its structure is too simple.
Both at the beginning and at the end of his presentation, Fedler emphasized that there is no "definitive moment" before which nothing matters and afterward everything does. Rather, from fertilization to birth the entire process of human gestation is a relatively smooth process. But after a month or so the new life has developed enough neurological complexity to require us to treat it differently, he contended.
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If there had been an opportunity, I would like to have explored several issues with Fedler.
The first of these would have concerned Exodus 21. Although I respect and appreciate the care with which he examined its various interpretations, I find it unnecessary to do so because the verses in question are embedded in a passage that contains much material that we rightly do not apply to our lives today. The very verses in question portray the woman as the property of her husband who deserves to be compensated if she is harmed.
Instead of doing what Fedler did, I think it is appropriate to exhibit this and then to move on to other things, having established that no one can legitimately appeal to this portion of Scripture in making his or her case about the moral status of the human embryo.
My second question would have concerned the likely implications of his emphasis on "personhood" at the other end of life. I believe that his position implies that humans who have permanently lost the ability to enter into relationships are no longer "persons" in the technical way he is uses the term. The implication of this would seem to be that in such cases we need not--or perhaps even should not--prolong the individual's life but instead do everything we can to make his or her process of dying as comfortable and dignified as possible.
I agree with Fedler's emphasis upon "personhood" and I endorse these likely implications. I suspect that he endorses them too; however, I would like to know for certain. I also hope that we can replace "person" and "non-person" with terms that are less likely to be misunderstood. But I'm not sure what they might be!
My third question would have concerned the importance he put on the fourth or fifth week. I am not sure what he would find ethically acceptable before this and what he would find ethically unacceptable after it. He did say that his position does not mean that before the first month "anything goes." We can therefore presume that he would also that it does not mean that after this time "nothing goes." But to my recollection Fedler was not more specific than this.
But why choose the first month? It seems to me that implantation is the most dramatic change in an otherwise relatively smooth process and that from then on we need to keep in mind that we are dealing with two biologically human and living entities. Once it has successfully implanted, the new life has the potential, meaning the inherent power, to become a human person and that as gestation progresses it increases moves toward this goal.
Already at implantation, within the first week or so, in my view, it is a potential human person. Before that, the conceptus, and before that the ovum and sperm, are not potential but possible human persons. What happens around the fourth or fifth week is important; however, as Felder himself said, the entire process is relatively smooth. I would say that this is so after implantation but not before.
For me this means that those of us who are Christians should be much more hesitant about terminating an established pregnancy than discarding or using in research or therapy embryos that have not implanted. Although this provides much opportunity for manipulating stem cells, it amounts to a strong ethical presumption against abortion and this presumption intensifies as the pregnancy progresses.
All presumptions can be overturned and a number of additional factors can overturn this one. These include rape, incest, serious fetal malformations and significant threats to the woman's physical, mental and social wellbeing.
Just as in a court of law an individual is presumed to be Innocent until the evidence establishes otherwise, so also I think that those of us who are Christians should presume that an embryo that has successfully implanted should be protected until other factors indicate the contrary. The default position is "pro-life" but this is presumptive, not absolute.
My responses to Fedler are endeavors in Christian bioethics that say nothing about what laws or other public policies should regulate the practice of abortion for all citizens. All laws should embody ethical principles but not all ethical principles should be embodied in laws.
My view is that at present and well into the foreseeable future some national norm along the lines of Roe v Wade is the most appropriate public policy, all things considered.